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Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals, 253pp, Black Rose 
Books, Montreal, New York, London, 1997. 
 
It is good to see the reissue/revised edition of this important book, which 
should be more widely known than it is. As the most detailed and 
systematic critique available of the pervasive assumptions of human-
centeredness that affect the treatment of animals in science and popular 
scientific culture, Beyond Boundaries should be on the reading list of every 
course that deals with animal issues or the human-animal interface. Beyond 
Boundaries is a small book that is accessible and not too intimidating for 
students, but still manages to cover a remarkable amount of ground, 
skilfully blending philosophy and empirical studies. New postscripts 
update the readings and sketch an unerringly radical course that navigates  
astutely between various hazards, for example the issue of whether animals 
should be of concern as individuals or as species. Some influential 
ecofeminist critiques of the treatment of animals focus heavily on hunting 
and masculinity, but Nose’s book, although still identifying as ecofeminist, 
strikes a much better balance, naming capitalism as well as patriarchy as 
the problem.  
 
The book opens with a brilliant critique of animal commodification of the 
contemporary ‘animal industrial complex’ which brings out significant 
parallels between rationalising scientific management of human workers 
and that of animal workers, the latter of course being far more ruthless. An 
impressively comprehensive historical chapter on the devaluation of nature 
and animals in the west then sets the scene for Noske’s discussion of 
human-animal continuity and locates the cultural sources of the pervasive 
mechanism that continues to frame most scientific approaches to the 
continuity question. This chapter includes very useful critiques of both 
Marx and Darwin, as major figures who where obliged to come to terms 
with the interrelatedness of humanity and animality, which argue that 
neither of them were able to overcome the subject-object approach. The 
next chapter builds on this to develop a major critique of sociobiology and 
other schools of animal investigation that neglect the individuality, 
subjectivity and autonomy of animals and reduce the types of explanations 
sought to the deterministic and mechanistc form that is usually taken to 
represent the ‘biological’. In this and the following chapter on discontinuity 
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Noske exposes in detail common fallacies in the treatment of animal 
communication. The concluding chapter presents a vision for a science of 
animals that is much more like anthropology, aiming to recognise the 
subjectivity of animals and meet them on their own ground instead of 
expecting them to perform according to human standards, escaping the 
‘dilemma...that there seems to be no option to imposing on animals either 
object status or human subject status’ through recognition of positive 
otherness. Beyond Boundaries is essential for anyone wanting in on this 
project and its sophisticated philosophical insights are crucial for 
developing more self-critical knowledge frameworks essential for doing 







Gary L. Francione, Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights 
Movement, xii + 269pp, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1996.  
 
Francione mounts a convincing argument that much of the ideology or 
theory behind the contemporary movements in support of animals is 
confused and that there are weaknesses in the animal welfare approaches 
which will always put a lid on change. It took me a while to get into 
Francione’s way of thinking as the key argument is peppered with much 
personal accusation which is distracting, especially if not all the figures are 
known to the reader. However this is not a side issue for Francione as these 
are the figures who are producing the muddled thinking.  
 
About  a third of the way into Rain without Thunder  I came to accept his 
argument against his opponents but I am not totally convinced of all 
aspects of his positive view. I make these personal references because I 
believe the book is important but the tone may put some readers off 
especially in the beginning. Persist.  
 
Who are Francione’s opponents? Those who support animal welfare, even 
those who support animal welfare as a means of eventually bringing about 
animal rights. Animal welfarists take their main task to be the alleviation of 
pain and suffering. Francione argues firstly that they are not very successful 
in this aim. Most of the national organisations looking out for the interests 
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of animals, at least in the US, are dominated he claims by a welfarist 
approach. Animal welfare is encoded in legislation and regulation. Yet 
animals suffer more now than one hundred years ago. The rearing of 
animals for food has moved more into intensive farming practices which 
generate greater suffering than previous practices. Animal experimentation 
is getting worse with genetic engineering and cross-species transplants 
presenting ‘new and arguably worse threats to animals in terms of pain and 
suffering’  (p.115). He states that there is no evidence that animal 
experiments in general are decreasing or that there has been a significant 
drop in the number of painful experiments without analgesics or 
anaesthesia.  Hunting continues. Furs are still worn and so on. 
  
Francione does not discuss the European experience which reveals greater 
gains, especially on hunting, on battery chickens and  on cosmetic 
experimentation using animals. It would help in evaluating Francione’s 
argument to ascertain whether the welfarist approach is as dominant in 
Europe as the US. I suspect not.3 
 
Secondly Francioni argues that it is simply inconsistent to claim to support 
a long term goal of animal rights by pursuing an animal welfare agenda in 
the short term. This is because an animal rights view rejects the treatment of 
animals as means to human ends, but a welfare position accepts that they 
can be means to human ends, so long as the ends are ‘significant’ and the 
treatment is ‘humane’. Francione acknowledges that different 
interpretations may be put on these two terms, so that on the one hand 
those who exploit animals might be said to adopt an animal welfare 
position or on the other hand, there are those who make serious attempts to 
limit what counts as ‘significant’.  Here he cites Robert Garner’s book, 
Animals, Politics and Morality as presenting the most progressive analysis. 
Even Garner’s position is unsatisfactory for Francione however as it does 
not oppose all uses of animals as means for human ends.  
 
It is the rejection of this use of animals or put another way, the rejection of 
the property status of animals which Francione sees as the key element of 
the animal rights approach and the only way to improve the lot of animals. 
While animals are regarded as the property of humans a conflict between 
them ‘is identical to that between a person and her shoe’ (p.127) He draws 
the analogy between animals and slaves and notes that concern about the 
                                                 
3 See Nichola Taylor, ‘Wither rights? Animal rights and the rise of new 
welfarism?’ Animal Issues, 3,1, (1999), pp. 27-41. 
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welfare of slaves was quite a different matter from attempts to abolish the 
practice. This does not mean that it was inappropriate for people to show 
compassion for slaves, or for instance to give them water, but that welfarist 
campaigns on the part of slaves were unlikely to be important in ending the 
practice.  This contrast  between working for welfare and working for the 
end of exploitation has surfaced recently in Australia with the concerns 
about collusion in an unjust practice which trouble members of animal 
ethics committees who are there as animal guardians. 
 
Francione is quite right to point out that Singer has confused the debates by 
defending a philosophy which does not call into question the property 
status of animals and using rights talk as a political slogan. (I would not go 
so far as to agree however that Singer is caught in a welfare position.4) 
 
Francione sets up a contrast between animal welfare and animal rights as 
an exclusive one. This is incorrect. There are positions which could be 
characterized by neither perspective5 but putting that to one side, what 
merits are there in his positive view? He claims that an animal rights 
philosophy is not utopian. There is little possibility of achieving its aims 
quickly but  there are various incremental changes in line with the rights 
philosophy which are realizable eg. refusing in one’s own practices to be 
involved in the exploitation of animals as much as is possible, involvement 
in education, protests, demonstrations, boycotts and campaigns, usually 
outside the legislative and regulative processes. The latter rider is added as 
changes within these processes would most likely be simply reforms in 
institutional exploitation. Such reforms would carry the assumption that it 
is acceptable to violate animal rights in the short term which he of course 
rejects. Short term aims (ie. aims short of the abolition of animal 
exploitation) could involve various prohibitions, eg. making the use of 
animals in drug addiction experiments illegal, the Great Ape Project 
(removal of all chimpanzees, orangutans and gorillas from all exploitation), 
an absolute prohibition of animal use for product testing or in drug 
addiction studies, the elimination of battery cages, and  the prohibition on 
dehorning of animals.  
 
                                                 
4 See An Interview with Peter Singer, Animal Issues, 1,1, (1997), pp.37-44. 
5 See for instance Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals  (Black 
Rose Books, Montreal, 1997) reviewed above.  
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Francione relies on Tom Regan’s theorizing6 to give substance to his rights 
philosophy. This is where I start to part company. The argument against 
the limitations of a welfarist approach is well put and the plea to drop the 
property status of animals is well made and can be sustained by appealing 
to the intrinsic value of animals without adopting a rights position. One 
doesn’t need to take that extra step.  
 
The foundation for according intrinsic value to animals is not sufficiently 
well worked out in Regan’s book. Francione skips over this problem by 
simply referring to Regan’s notion of ‘subject-of-a-life’ without going into 
further details. This is the concept which Regan uses to claim that animals 
have intrinsic value and to be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual who 
has beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future with 
feelings of pleasure and pain; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of one’s 
desires and goals and an individual welfare in the sense that one’s 
experiential life fares well or ill for one.7 Does this apply to a chicken? 
Probably not, yet Francione is certainly putting an argument for stopping 
the exploitation of chickens if not all animals. Also this description accords 
value to aspects of life which humans value. Perhaps or even most likely, 
animals value life in a different way. Regan’s criteria have a rationalistic, 
anthropocentric ring.  
 
Regan argues for animal rights on the basis of their inherent value. 
However the rights talk comes across as somewhat superfluous. He doesn’t 
introduce the notion until near the end of his theorizing and drops it in his 
summing up. There are notorious problems with notions of rights such as 
how to deal with conflict between different rights and if there is no way of 
enforcing them appeals to rights can be empty. Francione interweaves his 
discussion of rights more into his theorizing but I am not convinced that a 
lot would be lost if he dropped it.  
 
Rain without Thunder is a very rigorously argued clarification of some key 
points in contemporary theorizing about animals. The rain could be tears 




                                                 
6 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1983) 
7 Ibid., section 7.5.  
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